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S/1999/1051
12 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN PREVLAKA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1252 (1999) of 15 July 1999 in which the Council requested, by 15 October 1999, a report with recommendations and options to develop confidence-building measures between the parties to the disputed issue of Prevlaka.

2. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) consists of 27 United Nations military observers (see annex) headed by a Chief Military Observer, Colonel Graeme Williams (New Zealand). In accordance with its mandate, UNMOP continues to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and of the neighbouring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and holds regular meetings with the local authorities so as to strengthen liaison, reduce tensions, improve safety and security and promote confidence between the parties. The Chief Military Observer also maintains contact with the authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade in order to address issues arising from the implementation of resolution 1252 (1999). Cooperation between UNMOP and the multinational stabilization force (SFOR) is maintained through regular meetings.

II. SITUATION IN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MISSION

3. Since the submission of my report of 8 July 1999 (S/1999/764), the situation in the UNMOP area of responsibility has remained stable and calm. The Mission maintains a 24-hour presence at its team site on the Ostra peninsula, at Herceg Novi in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro), and at the headquarters at Cavtat and the team site at Gruda in Croatia.

4. The area of responsibility of UNMOP consists of two United Nations-designated zones: a demilitarized zone (the so-called "Yellow Zone") where the presence of military personnel and heavy weapons is prohibited, and a United Nations-controlled zone (the so-called "Blue Zone") which was placed under the exclusive authority of the United Nations until such time as the parties reach an agreement concerning that area.

5. UNMOP maintains the interpretation of the limits of the United Nations-designated zones as defined in reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council since 1992, regardless of unilateral decisions by one party or the other not to respect the United Nations-mandated security regime. In accordance with established procedure, UNMOP has continued to protest about violations of both the demilitarized zone and the United Nations-controlled zone to the authorities in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the Republic of Montenegro, in order to encourage greater respect for the security regime governing the zones and to improve the freedom of movement of the United Nations military observers.

6. During the reporting period, the situation of identified minefields in the UNMOP area of responsibility remained unchanged.

Demilitarized zone

7. The continuing presence of troops of the Yugoslav Army in the northern part of the demilitarized zone constitutes a significant violation. Owing to long-standing constraints imposed by the Yugoslav authorities on the movement of United Nations military observers, UNMOP remains unable to ascertain the exact strength and armament of those units. The Yugoslav authorities, while denying unrestricted access to that area, do allow escorted visits when given a minimum of six hours' notice.

8. Croatia has not removed the restrictions it places on the movement of UNMOP patrols in the north-western part of the demilitarized zone. It requires UNMOP to provide 24 hours' notice before undertaking foot patrols in this area and has occasionally prevented UNMOP from patrolling.

9. The crossing point at Debeli Brijeg, in the demilitarized zone, remains open on a 24-hour basis. It allows the movement of civilians and commercial traffic between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro) and does not constitute a violation of the demilitarization regime.

United Nations-controlled zone

10. The long-standing violations of the security regime in the United Nations-controlled zone, as previously reported (see S/1999/16, S/1999/404 and S/1999/764), continue unchanged. Approximately 25 Croatian Special Police are located at four positions and approximately 10 Yugoslav (Montenegrin) Border Police are present at two positions inside that zone. In addition, the operation of a local crossing point at Cape Kobila in the United Nations-controlled zone, which is currently open for four hours a day, as well as the presence in that zone of manned checkpoints of both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro), are violations of the United Nations-mandated security regime since they imply that the Croatian and Montenegrin authorities permit local residents to enter the United Nations-controlled zone for the purpose of crossing into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro) and Croatia, respectively. The Croatian authorities also continue to permit civilians, including local and foreign tourists, to enter the zone from the

Croatian side for fishing, farming and recreational purposes. This, too, constitutes a violation of the security regime.

11. The waters of the United Nations-controlled zone continue to be violated frequently by Croatian and Yugoslav fishing boats and occasionally by Croatian police boats.

12. The violations described above do not by themselves constitute a serious security threat. However, seen together, they demonstrate disregard for the security regime which the parties have freely agreed upon.

III. PROGRESS TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

13. Both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia have repeatedly indicated their willingness to resolve their dispute over Prevlaka through bilateral negotiations pursuant to the Agreement on Normalization of Relations signed by them at Belgrade on 23 August 1996 (see S/1996/706, annex). As previously reported, each Government has submitted a proposal for settling the dispute (see S/1998/533 and S/1998/632) and their negotiating teams have so far held four rounds of talks: the first at Zagreb on 15 September 1998, the second at Belgrade on 9 October 1998, the third at Zagreb on 23 December 1998 and the fourth at Belgrade on 9 March 1999. No talks have been held since that time. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1252 (1999), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has reported on the state of the negotiations in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 4 October 1999 (S/1999/1027). The latest Croatian position is set out in a letter dated 13 July 1999 (S/1999/783 and Corr.1) and in the statement of its Foreign Minister to the General Assembly on 25 September 1999 (see A/54/PV.15).

IV. OBSERVATIONS

14. The crossing point at Debeli Brijeg in the demilitarized zone does not violate the demilitarization regime since it is not being used for military purposes. Indeed, its presence helps to boost confidence at the local level between residents of Croatia and Montenegro who use it freely in both directions and do so in large numbers. However, the Yugoslav federal authorities continue to deny the legality of this crossing point (see S/1999/84). Insofar as the operation of the crossing point serves the wider interests of confidence-building between the parties, it would be opportune to regularize its opening.

15. As observed previously (see S/1999/404 and S/1999/764), the opening and maintenance of a crossing point at Cape Kobila, in the United Nations-controlled zone, as opposed to the opening of the crossing at Debeli Brijeg in the demilitarized zone, is a violation of the United Nations-mandated security regime. The United Nations military observers report that the level of traffic passing through this crossing point remains negligible in comparison with that at Debeli Brijeg. Reports provided to UNMOP by the Croatian authorities, as corroborated by United Nations military observers, indicate only eight vehicle crossings, at Cape Kobila between the beginning of the Mission's current mandate

on 15 July 1999 and 7 October 1999. In contrast, at the nearby crossing of Debeli Brijeg it is not uncommon for more than 100 vehicles and several hundred persons to use the crossing daily during the height of the tourist season.

16. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia could endeavour to adjust the security regime so that the opening of a crossing point in the United Nations-controlled zone did not result in a violation of the existing security regime. In the meantime, UNMOP will continue to record as a violation each unauthorized entry into the United Nations-controlled zone, including those at the crossing point at Cape Kobila.

17. A significant practical step which the parties could take in support of a peaceful solution to their dispute over Prevlaka would be to demonstrate full respect for the United Nations-monitored security regime. At the present time, the demilitarized zone is stable and free of heavy weapons. The more significant violations of the security regime are the standing presence of troops of the Yugoslav Army in the northern part of the demilitarized zone and that of Croatian Special Police and Yugoslav (Montenegrin) Border Police in the United Nations-controlled zone.

18. Since my last report, no invitation has been issued for a fifth round of talks between the two parties. Conditions of stability and calm on the ground have been maintained in part thanks to the presence of UNMOP, and that is conducive to negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Prevlaka in a constructive and expeditious manner. Member States may wish to use their influence with the parties to assist in the formulation of steps which will demonstrate respect for the United Nations zones, create an atmosphere of confidence, and thus serve to move the negotiation process forward.

19. Central to the maintenance of stability in the UNMOP area of responsibility is the requirement that the United Nations military observers be permitted to patrol their area of operation without restriction or constraint of any kind. I once again call upon the authorities of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow them unrestricted access to all areas of the demilitarized zone at all times.

20. In addition to the measures recommended in the preceding paragraphs, and pursuant to the Council's request in resolution 1252 (1999), the parties have been provided informally, at my request, with a number of recommendations and options to develop confidence-building measures aimed, inter alia, at further facilitating the freedom of movement of the civilian population. These recommendations and options cover basic elements of the disputed issue, confidence-building measures and freedom of movement. I shall keep the Council informed of further progress in this direction.

21. In conclusion, the Chief Military Observer and the men and women of UNMOP are to be commended for their continued efforts to maintain peace and security in their area of responsibility.

Annex

Composition and strength of the military element of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka as at 30 September 1999

Nationality	Number of military observers
Argentina	1
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Finland	1
Ghana	2
Indonesia	2
Ireland	1
Jordan	1
Kenya	1
Nepal	1
New Zealand	2
Nigeria	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Russian Federation	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Ukraine	1
Total	27

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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 12 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Indonesia strongly deplores the incident that took place in Mato Ain, a village close to the border of East Timor, Regency of Kabupaten Belu, province of East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor).

The chronology of facts concerning the aforementioned incident is the following:

1. On Sunday, 10 October 1999, at 12.30 p.m., the military and police personnel in the Mato Ain station, upon hearing the sounds of armoured vehicles approaching, in accordance with standard procedures, stood ready on alert in anticipation of the situation. What occurred, thereafter, was that one of the personnel fired warning shots in the air to alert the other personnel to get ready. The sound of the shots, however, was interpreted by INTERFET to be directed against them and hence they opened fire against the Indonesian side. The ensuing exchange of shots caused the following casualties:

- One policeman, namely, Private Second Class Hari Sudibyo was killed;
- One policeman, namely, First Sergeant Agus Sudarto was severely wounded;
- One policeman, namely, First Sergeant Agus Susanto, and one civilian (name unknown) sustained minor injuries.

2. The exchange of fire ceased after the Commander of INTERFET, Major Mark Kelly and the Commander of platoon YONIF 743 (infantry battalion), Second Lieutenant Erwin, ordered their personnel to stop their actions immediately.

3. At 2 p.m., the District Commander of Atambua, Lieutenant Colonel Sigit, arrived at the location of the incident to meet with Major Mark Kelly, who was accompanied by Major Brian, the interpreter.

The summary of their discussions is as follows:

- INTERFET stated earlier that they were still in East Timor territory to pursue two individuals suspected of being members of the militia.

- The District Commander conveyed to his counterpart that, according to the map and the stone boulders separating East Timor from East Nusa Tenggara (West Timor), INTERFET had trespassed into the province of East Nusa Tenggara.

- Based on the above explanations given by the District Commander, Major Kelly acknowledged the error and apologized while he withdrew his personnel.

These facts clearly show that the incident took place within the national territory of Indonesia and not in East Timor. Even if this was a result of an accident because of a difference in maps, it is baffling how INTERFET that supposedly possesses sophisticated equipment could make such a miscalculation. Indonesia, therefore, demands that necessary disciplinary action be taken against those responsible for this incident and that further measures be initiated by the INTERFET Commander to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Makarim WIBISONO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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LETTER DATED 12 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In a letter dated 11 June 1999 addressed to the President of the Security Council, I informed the members of the Council that I had approved the distribution plan submitted by the Government of Iraq for the purchase and distribution of humanitarian supplies during the new period specified in paragraph 1 of resolution 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999, phase VI, on the understanding that, inter alia, in the event that it was estimated that revenue could be generated at a level that would exceed the target referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1242 (1999), in anticipation of the Council's review of the matter pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1242 (1999), I would consult with the Government of Iraq concerning the utilization of the additional revenue and, as necessary, make recommendations to the Council (S/1999/671). Accordingly, on 18 August 1999, the Government of Iraq was invited to submit, taking into account the sectoral priorities set forth by the Security Council in resolution 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998 and in successive resolutions, proposals for the utilization of the additional revenue for my consideration and recommendations thereon to the Council.

Taking into account Security Council resolution 1266 (1999), of 4 October 1999, the Government of Iraq was informed today that I had approved the proposed adjustments submitted for my consideration by the Government of Iraq, transmitted in a letter dated 28 September 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (see appendix I).

In my latest report to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1242 (1999) (S/1999/896, para. 94), I recalled that the Government of Iraq had already indicated in the distribution plan for phase VI that, if oil revenues generated during phase VI were likely to exceed the total of the $3.004 billion required for the implementation of the approved distribution plan, the Government intended to enter into additional contracts for oil spare parts and equipment up to the value of $300 million (S/1999/671, annex II, enclosure). The Government has reconfirmed its intention in that regard in its submission of the revised sectoral allocations referred to above.

As stated in my previous reports to the Security Council, as well as in my most recent letter dated 2 and 22 July 1999 addressed to the President of the

Security Council (S/1999/746 and Add.1), the oil industry of Iraq continues to be in a lamentable state, the details of which are provided in the aforementioned letter. The group of experts indicated that the amount requested by the Government of Iraq ($600 million) is considered to be commensurate with the production levels achieved and predicted, given in particular the emphasis placed on major projects and investment in safety, control of pollution and environmental damage (S/1999/746, para. 48).

Accordingly, I recommend that the Security Council approve the request to increase by $300 million the allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, bringing the total allocation to $600 million, during the current phase.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

Annex

Letter dated 12 October 1999 from the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations

On behalf of the Secretary-General, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 28 September 1999, concerning the proposed adjustments by the Government of Iraq of phase VI allocations, in light of increased oil revenues during the current phase, for the Secretary-General's consideration and approval (see appendix I).

Further to the letter dated 11 June 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/671) approving the distribution plan for phase VI, and taking into account Security Council resolution 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999, I have the honour, on behalf of the Secretary-General, to inform the Government of Iraq, through you, that, having examined the proposed adjustments, the Secretary-General has approved the adjustments with the following understandings.

The adoption of Security Council resolution 1266 (1999) will, for the first time, enable the humanitarian programme established pursuant to resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 to be sufficiently funded for the implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General (S/1998/90), as endorsed by the Council in resolution 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998. The sectoral allocations should be kept under review with due regard to paragraph 2 of resolution 1153 (1998) providing that the food and nutrition and health sectors are allocated funds on a priority basis.

In particular, given the unsatisfactory nutritional situation prevalent in Iraq and the necessity of providing a full food basket on a monthly basis, and also taking into account the effects of the current drought, it is essential to keep under constant review the funding level of the food sector. While welcoming the Government's proposed modest increase in the target caloric value of the food basket to 2,200 kilocalories per person per day, in view of the additional funds available, the Secretary-General recommends that the caloric value of the food basket should be increased at the minimum to 2,300 kilocalories per person per day country-wide, which was the level approved for the enhanced distribution plan for phase IV (S/1998/446).

The information that the Government of Iraq has contracted all the targeted nutrition supplies in quantities set out in the approved distribution plans for phases IV, V and VI is welcomed. I would like to recall that, in light of the findings of the recent child and maternal mortality survey (July 1999), conducted by the United Nations Children's Fund and the Government of Iraq, the Secretary-General had recommended in his report to the Security Council that the Government of Iraq increase the funding for the targeted nutrition programmes so as to expeditiously improve the nutritional status of children (S/1999/896, para. 103). Furthermore, in order to ensure timely and regular distribution of the supplies, the allocation for the targeted nutrition programme should be

increased to provide adequate warehousing, transportation and related infrastructure.

With regard to the health sector, at this stage of the programme, when sufficient funding is available, it is essential to ensure that all measures are taken to procure and distribute all essential pharmaceuticals in a timely manner. The ratio established between drugs and medical equipment set out in the approved distribution plan for phase VI (S/1999/671) should be fully implemented.

In order to address the health and nutritional requirements of the population, the allocation for water and sanitation should be sufficiently funded. The Ministry of Health has repeatedly stated that the provision of clean drinking water to the population is critical in reducing levels of malnutrition. Although the increased allocation to the water and sanitation sector is welcome, the sector has been relatively under-funded in comparison with other sectors in previous phases. Specific consideration should be given to the provision of operational/maintenance supplies in order to enhance the implementation capacity of water authorities.

With respect to the Government of Iraq's request for the introduction of a new sector, namely housing construction supplies, I wish to inform you that, without prejudice to the merit of the proposal made by the Government, the Secretary-General is not in a position at this stage to endorse the proposed allocation in the distribution plan for phase VI. The proposal will be given further consideration and will require a review to, inter alia, clarify objectives, identify beneficiaries and determine appropriate observation resources and procedures.

With regard to the proposed allocation of $10 million for banking requirements, I should like to reiterate what was stated at the time of the approval of the distribution plan for phase VI (S/1999/671, annex I), that the Secretary-General's acceptance of the revised sectoral allocations does not constitute an endorsement of either the budgetary allocation of equipment and supplies in support of the banking requirements, referred to in paragraph 67 of the plan, or the specific items listed in annex IX to the plan.

It may be recalled that, in approving the distribution plan for phase VI, the Secretary-General took note of the proposal in paragraph 12 of the distribution plan, including the indication given by the Government of Iraq that if oil revenues generated during phase VI were likely to exceed the total of the $3.004 billion required for the implementation of the approved distribution plan, the Government intended to enter into additional contracts for spare parts and equipment up to the value of $300 million (S/1999/671, annex II, enclosure). The Secretary-General supports the proposal of the Government of Iraq for an additional $300 million allocation for the purchase of oil spare parts and equipment, and is therefore recommending to the Security Council that it approve the request, bringing the total allocation to $600 million, during the current phase.

I should also like to recall that, owing to revenue shortfalls during phase IV, it was necessary to transfer approved applications with a value of

approximately $510 million for funding under phase V. These transfers, coupled with the value of additional phase V applications yet to be submitted and the ultimate status of phase V applications currently on hold, may result in subsequent transfers of phase V applications to phase VI. The availability of phase VI revenues to fund the full extent of new contracts arising from the Government of Iraq's plan for the use of the revenue increases, as authorized by resolution 1266 (1999), will therefore need to be considered vis-à-vis the yet to be determined transfers from phase V.

In light of the above, and, in view of the volatility of oil prices, the revenue received from oil exports should be kept under constant review in order to make the necessary adjustments for funding approved applications, bearing in mind the priorities set forth by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

(Signed) Benon SEVAN
Executive Director
Office of the Iraq Programme

Appendix I

Letter dated 28 September 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme

With reference to your letter dated 18 August 1999 concerning the adjustment of phase VI allocations in the light of increased oil revenues, I am transmitting to you herewith a table showing the increases approved by the Government of Iraq for the phase VI sectors under the 53 per cent account and the 13 per cent account. I should like to state as follows:

I.

The allocation to the food sector under the 53 per cent account and the 13 per cent account has been increased by $103 million. This will raise the caloric value of the food basket to 2,200 when the additional amount is used to provide another 250 grams of cooking oil and increase the allocations for dried whole milk and/or cheese and for pulses to accord with the full quantities approved in the phase VI distribution plan. We are also transmitting herewith: a revision of table 3 of the distribution plan to show the allocation of an additional amount of $103 million for the importation of cooking oil, milk and/or cheese and pulses; and a revision of the table showing food-related supplies and equipment, where an additional sum of $20 million is being allocated to the importation of tyres and batteries for distribution to the transport fleets used to carry foodstuffs from the port at Umm Qasr to warehouses in all parts of Iraq. The Ministry of Trade is also placing quantities of domestically produced foodstuffs in central and local markets for distribution to citizens of limited income through such outlets at nominal prices. These items are:

1. 300,000 tons of rice, with 1 kilogram to be allocated to each person;

2. 500,000 tons of wheat, or the equivalent of 450,000 tons of flour, with one-half kilogram to be allocated to each person;

3. 25,000 tons of domestically produced vegetable oil, with 100 grams to be allocated to each person.

The farmers from whom these items will be purchased will also store sufficient quantities for their own needs and those of their families. With the distribution of these items, caloric intake per person will be at least 2,300 per month.

The Ministry of Trade is also placing quantities of domestically produced soap and detergent in central markets for distribution to citizens at nominal prices.

Increasing caloric intake and improving nutrition cannot solve the problems associated with the health, nutritional and social standards of Iraqi citizens in the absence of healthy and appropriate housing that meets the sanitary

requirements of normal life. The population of Iraq has increased by more than five million since 1990, and this has meant increased population density and overcrowded dwellings. Disruptions in the electricity supply and sanitation problems have promoted the spread of diseases, especially contagious diseases. The comprehensive sanctions that have been maintained against Iraq since 6 August 1990 have made it impossible to provide the dwellings required to meet the population increase. There is also, of course, the deterioration that has taken place in the existing housing stock. In view of the additional oil revenues projected for phase VI, the sum of $112.1 million has been set aside for the importation of supplies for the construction of dwellings to be allocated to citizens in accordance with the mechanism established by the memorandum of understanding. We therefore transmit herewith a list of items and quantities as an amendment to the annexes to the distribution plan, under the item "Housing construction supplies", together with a detailed explanation of the reasons for the allocation of this sum to dwellings for citizens. As the authority concerned with such matters, the Ministry of Trade would import and distribute these items.

II.

The Ministry of Health has accorded particular importance to the question of high-protein biscuits and therapeutic milk. It has allocated the sum of $27 million for the importation of these two items for phases IV, V and VI, that is to say $9 million for each phase. This will help to improve the nutritional situation of infants and expectant mothers. The Ministry signed contracts as follows:

1. Phase IV

(a) High-protein biscuits: Two contracts were signed with the Dutch company Pally, one (No. 40/99/806) in the amount of $1,692,100 and one (No. 40/99/402) in the amount of $4,307,857, for 4,800 tons. Shipment is in progress and delivery is expected at the end of September 1999.

(b) Therapeutic milk: A contract (No. 40/99/24) was signed with the French company Rippoz in the amount of $3,400,000 for 1,500 tons.

The phase IV requirement for these two items was thus met.

2. Phase V

(a) High-protein biscuits: A contract for 4,800 tons has been forwarded to the Yemeni company Ha'il Sa'id and steps are being taken with a view to its signing. This quantity represents the full phase V requirement.

(b) Therapeutic milk: A contract (No. 40/99/380) was signed with the Danish company M. D. Food on 27 September 1999 in the amount of $3,280,000 for 1,500 tons. This represents the full phase V requirement.

3. Phase VI

(a) High-protein biscuits: A contract (No. 40/99/379) was signed with the Dutch company Pally on 25 September 1999 in the amount of $6,000,000 for 4,800 tons.

(b) Therapeutic milk: A contract (No. 40/99/378) was signed with the French company Rippoz on 28 September 1999 in the amount of $3,289,470 for 1,500 tons.

The full phase VI requirement for these two items has thus been met.

We request approval of the amounts allocated to the various sectors as indicated in the annexed table showing the amended phase VI allocations.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Appendix II

AMENDED PHASE VI ALLOCATIONS

Sector	13 per cent			53 per cent			66 per cent		
	Allocated	Additional	Total	Allocated	Additional	Total	Allocated	Additional	Total
Food	138	15.5	153.5	777	87.5	864.5	915	103	1 018
Food-related supplies	0	0	0	207	72	279	207	72	279
Housing construction supplies	0	0	0	0	112.1	112.1	0	112.1	112.1
Health	44	7	51	206	33	239	250	40	290
Electricity	140	81.4	221.4	300	225	525	440	306.4	746.4
Agriculture	52	30.2	82.2	99	88.8	187.8	274	229	503
Irrigation				123	110	233			
Education	28	16.3	44.3	57	58	115	127	112.3	239.3
Higher education				42	38	80			
Interior	30	17.5	47.5	160	75	235	280	151.5	431.5
Municipality of Baghdad				90	59	149			
Transport and communications	19.6	11.4	31	100.4	12.2	112.6	120	23.6	143.6
Central Bank	0	0	0	10	0	10	10	0	10
Resettlement	54	31.4	85.4	0	0	0	54	31.4	85.4
Nutrition	18	10.5	28.5	0	0	0	18	10.5	28.5
Mine clearance	9	5.2	14.2	0	0	0	9	5.2	14.2
Total	532.6	226.4	759	2 171.4	970.6	3 124	2 704	1 197	3 901
Oil	0	0	0	300	300	600	300	300	600

PHASE 6

Items	Monthly ration per capita (kg)	Total monthly requirements (ton)	Total needs for six months (ton)	Required value for six months (US$)
Food				
Wheat flour	9	257 000	1 542 000	260 000 000
Rice	2.5	60 000	360 000	120 000 000
Sugar	2	48 000	288 000	82 000 000
Tea	0.15	3 550	21 300	42 000 000
Cooking oil	1.25	30 100	180 600	135 000 000
Milk powder	3.6	2 520	15 120	43 000 000
Dried whole milk and/or cheese	0.5	11 800	70 800	170 000 000
Fortified weaning cereal	0.8	560	3 360	7 000 000
Pulses	1	24 000	144 000	85 000 000
Iodized salt	0.15	3 600	21 600	3 000 000
Subtotal				947 000 000
Soaps and detergent soap	0.25	6 100	36 600	34 000 000
Detergents	0.35	8 500	51 000	37 000 000
Total				71 000 000
Grand total				1 018 000 000

ELECTRICAL ACCESSORIES AND LIGHTING FITTINGS

ITEM	ACTIVITY	END USER	QUANTITY
PVC single core wire according to BS 6014/75 stranded and solid	Using in building houses	People	5 000 KM
500 volt PVC flat wire according to BS 6004/75 stranded type copper conductor - PVC isolated and PVC sheathed outside Colour grey	-	-	3 000 KM
NYIFY wire solid conductor according to VDEO 250	-	-	4 000 KM
NYFGBY cable 0.6/1 KV PVC sheathed and PVC isolated - all conductors to be stranded and manufactured according to VDEO 271	-	-	1 500 M
Distribution board circuit breakers flash mounting complete with MC.B.SS.PN & 100 AM main switch D.P. isolator	-	-	5 000 PCS
Moulded case circuit breakers	-	-	4 000 PCS
Galvanized steel conduit pipes diameter 1.6 m thickness, 3.75 M length for eight pipe 2 ends threaded and 1 end coupled according to BS.4568	-	-	10 000 PCS

ELECTRICAL ACCESSORIES AND LIGHTING FITTINGS
"ALL ACCORDING TO BRITISH STANDARD"

ITEM	ACTIVITY	END USERS	QUANTITY PCS.
Flush type switches	Using in building houses	People	2 000 000
Flush type switch sockets	Using in building houses	People	750 000
Flush type bell push switches	Using in building houses	People	100 000
Flush type sockets	Using in building houses	People	100 000
Plugs	Using in building houses	People	600 000
Three and single phase iron and metal clad switch	Using in building houses	People	10 000
Lamp holders	Using in building houses	People	750 000
Lighting fixtures	Using in building houses	People	100 000
Starter fluorescent	Using in building houses	People	1 000 000
One and two gang boxes	Using in building houses	People	1 000 000
Musical bells	Using in building houses	People	100 000
Socket and plug	Using in building houses	People	100 000
Fluorescent tubes	Using in building houses	People	750 000
Bulbs	-	-	750 000
Mercury lamps	-	-	300 000

(STEEL)

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	QUANTITY
1	Reinforcing deformed bars	Ton	50 000
2	Galvanized plain sheets	Ton	25 000
3	Window section	Ton	15 000
4	Black anealed wire	Ton	2 000
5	Teak plywood and commercial wood	Sheet	2 000 000
6	Teak wood	Cubic foot	200 000
7	White wood	Cubic metre	60 000
8	Block board	Sheet	200 000
9	Bath set with chromium fittings	Set	10 000
10	Wall and floor tiles	Square metre	500 000
11	Galvanized water pipes	Piece	2 000 000

[Rationale for the new item, "Housing construction supplies"]

1. Before the embargo, the State would spend some 1 billion dollars [a year] on average to import construction materials and supplies.

2. The construction of housing in Iraq would proceed in a systematic manner in keeping with population growth. The State would make available construction materials and supplies and would also build housing for Iraqi families and provide loans to citizens to build housing themselves.

3. While the embargo has been in force, the population of Iraq has grown from 18 million to 23 million. It has become impossible to provide housing to meet the increase in population and to compensate for depreciation in the existing housing stock because of the large quantities of construction materials required. The embargo and the impossibility of securing construction supplies as before has thus brought about a high degree of overcrowding in such housing as does exist.

4. The consequent overcrowding (together with disruptions in electricity supply and problems in the sanitation area) has promoted the spread of contagious diseases. The items in question are thus of a humanitarian nature, and their importance is similar to that of food and medicine.

ITEM	ACTIVITY	END USERS	QUANTITY
Tyres with tube flaps (different sizes)	Spares for all trucks used for transporting and handling grain and foodstuff	Ministry of Trade Grain Board and Food Stuff Co., grain processing	150 000 sets
Batteries (different capacities)	Spare for all trucks and forklifts used for transporting and handling grains and foodstuff	Ministry of Trade Grain Board and Food Stuff Co.	50 000 pieces

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1054
15 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

Canada, the Netherlands, Russian Federation, Slovenia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, 1193 (1998) of 28 August 1998 and 1214 (1998) of 8 December 1998, and the statements of its President on the situation in Afghanistan,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, and its respect for Afghanistan's cultural and historical heritage,

Reiterating its deep concern over the continuing violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights, particularly discrimination against women and girls, and over the significant rise in the illicit production of opium, and stressing that the capture by the Taliban of the Consulate-General of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the murder of Iranian diplomats and a journalist in Mazar-e-Sharif constituted flagrant violations of established international law,

Recalling the relevant international counter-terrorism conventions and in particular the obligations of parties to those conventions to extradite or prosecute terrorists,

Strongly condemning the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, and reaffirming its conviction that the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deploring the fact that the Taliban continues to provide safe haven to Usama bin Laden and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban-controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorist operations,

99-30056 (E) 151099

Noting the indictment of Usama bin Laden and his associates by the United States of America for, inter alia, the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and for conspiring to kill American nationals outside the United States, and noting also the request of the United States of America to the Taliban to surrender them for trial (S/1999/1021),

Determining that the failure of the Taliban authorities to respond to the demands in paragraph 13 of resolution 1214 (1998) constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Stressing its determination to ensure respect for its resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Insists that the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, comply promptly with its previous resolutions and in particular cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice;

2. Demands that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice;

3. Decides that on 14 November 1999 all States shall impose the measures set out in paragraph 4 below, unless the Council has previously decided, on the basis of a report of the Secretary-General, that the Taliban has fully complied with the obligation set out in paragraph 2 above;

4. Decides further that, in order to enforce paragraph 2 above, all States shall:

(a) Deny permission for any aircraft to take off from or land in their territory if it is owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation such as the performance of the Hajj;

(b) Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,

by the Taliban, except as may be authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need;

5. Urges all States to cooperate with efforts to fulfil the demand in paragraph 2 above, and to consider further measures against Usama bin Laden and his associates;

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to effectively implementing the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above;

(b) To consider information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;

(c) To make periodic reports to the Council on the impact, including the humanitarian implications, of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above;

(d) To make periodic reports to the Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above, identifying where possible persons or entities reported to be engaged in such violations;

(e) To designate the aircraft and funds or other financial resources referred to in paragraph 4 above in order to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by that paragraph;

(f) To consider requests for exemptions from the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above as provided in that paragraph, and to decide on the granting of an exemption to these measures in respect of the payment by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to the aeronautical authority of Afghanistan on behalf of international airlines for air traffic control services;

(g) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 below;

7. Calls upon all States to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of coming into force of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above;

8. Calls upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities within their jurisdiction that violate the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above and to impose appropriate penalties;

9. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee established by paragraph 6 above in the fulfilment of its tasks, including

supplying such information as may be required by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

10. Requests all States to report to the Committee established by paragraph 6 above within 30 days of the coming into force of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above on the steps they have taken with a view to effectively implementing paragraph 4 above;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee established by paragraph 6 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

12. Requests the Committee established by paragraph 6 above to determine appropriate arrangements, on the basis of recommendations of the Secretariat, with competent international organizations, neighbouring and other States, and parties concerned with a view to improving the monitoring of the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above;

13. Requests the Secretariat to submit for consideration by the Committee established by paragraph 6 above information received from Governments and public sources on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above;

14. Decides to terminate the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above once the Secretary-General reports to the Security Council that the Taliban has fulfilled the obligation set out in paragraph 2 above;

15. Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of further measures, in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving the full implementation of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1999/1055
13 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 13 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I am writing upon the instruction of my Government, in its capacity as lead nation of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), to inform you of an incident that took place on Sunday, 10 October, in the vicinity of Motaain (Mato Ain), near the border between East and West Timor. The incident involved an exchange of fire between INTERFET and Indonesian forces (TNI and POLRI) and militia elements, and resulted in casualties on the Indonesian side.

The report of the INTERFET troop commander makes clear that the incident took place within the territory of East Timor. Weapons were fired first by TNI/POLRI, and INTERFET forces responded in accordance with their mandate and rules of engagement. Following the exchange of fire, the INTERFET troop commander discussed the incident with the senior TNI officer present, who acknowledged that TNI/POLRI had fired first and that the incident had taken place within East Timor.

A joint investigation by INTERFET and TNI/POLRI into the incident has commenced. The investigation team is scheduled to travel to the incident site on 14 October, and a report is expected to be available around 16 October. We will make this report available to the Security Council at the earliest opportunity.

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Penny WENSLEY

99-29658 (E) 131099

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1056
13 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The decision of the United Nations civil presence in Kosovo and Metohija, the autonomous province of the Yugoslav constituent Republic of Serbia, to contract the air companies Tyrolean (Austria), Adria Airlines (Slovenia) and ADA (Albania) to fly commercial flights to Pristina has been taken without the prior consent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This decision is contrary to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and violates the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) membership rights of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, all the more so as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no bilateral air traffic agreements with the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Slovenia.

In this context, it is recalled that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expressed its great concern at the unilateral and arbitrary decision of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to open Pristina Airport to commercial flights in my letter to the President of the Security Council of 1 October 1999 (S/1999/1019). Bearing these facts in mind, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reiterates its expectation that the decisions of UNMIK to open Pristina Airport and to grant permission to foreign air companies to fly commercial flights to Pristina will be revoked and that all relevant issues will be resolved in cooperation with the competent Federal authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-29669 (E) 131099

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1999/1057
14 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Please find enclosed an article by Reuters dated 12 October 1999, entitled "US senator questions 1998 bombing in Sudan" (see annex)

The article states that the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, after a CIA briefing on Tuesday, said he still questioned the quality of evidence that led to the US bombing of the Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Company in the Sudan last year and the timing of the attack. The Chairman stated: "I'm still troubled by the timing of the response by the US and I'm also concerned still about the standard of the evidence used".

This statement by the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee represents further evidence that the pretexts given by the US for the bombing of the Al-Shifa factory were flimsy, unsupported by any material evidence and based on faulty, misleading intelligence.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Elfatih ERWA
Permanent Representative

Annex

US senator questions 1998 bombing in Sudan

[Latest News From Sudan At Sudan.Net]

News Article by REUTERS on October 12, 1999 at 22:11:42:

US senator questions 1998 bombing in Sudan
By Tabassum Zakaria

WASHINGTON, Oct 12 (Reuters) - The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, after a CIA briefing on Tuesday, said he still questioned the quality of evidence that led to the U.S. bombing of a pharmaceutical company in Sudan last year and the timing of the attack.

"We had a closed hearing on the Al-Shifa situation today," Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby said, referring to the name of the pharmaceutical firm in Sudan.

"I'm still troubled by the timing of the response by the U.S. and I'm also concerned still about the standard of the evidence used," he said after the closed-door briefing by CIA Director George Tenet.

The United States destroyed the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant near Khartoum with cruise missiles in August 1998, wounding seven people, one of whom later died. It also bombed an area of Afghanistan that the United States believed was a base camp for followers of Saudi exile Osama bin Laden.

Both U.S. attacks were in retaliation for bombings earlier that month of two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed at least 226 people amd wounded more than 4,000. The United States has accused bin Laden of planning the attack.

The United States picked the Sudanese pharmaceutical company as a target because of a soil sample that showed the ingredient Empta, which is an ingredient of VX nerve gas.

U.S. policymakers made the decision to bomb that plant based on U.S. intelligence information that Empta was allegedly only used in Iraq's formula for VX nerve gas and that people at the pharmaceutical plant were visiting Iraqis linked to that country's suspected VX operation.

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The link to bin Laden was more tangential, but the United States believed the Saudi millionaire was allegedly seeking another large-scale operation against the United States.

Sudan and critics of the bombing said the pharmaceutical firm was just manufacturing medicines. The United States removed a freeze on the U.S. assets of Saleh Idris, the owner of the pharmaceutical factory in May. Idris's lawyer said indicated there was no proof that he was linked to any terrorist group.

The timing of the bombing has been questioned by some critics of President Bill Clinton as a possible attempt to create a distraction from the mess over the public revelations of his affair with Monica Lewinsky that eventually led to his impeachment.

Asked whether he considered the bombing of the pharmaceutical company in Sudan unjustified, Shelby, an Alabama Republican, responded: "I wouldn't say that. I just said that I was still troubled by the timing and the standard of evidence."

Two other senators who attended the CIA briefing said unequivocally that the bombing was justified.

Sen. Robert Kerrey, a Nebraska Democrat who is Vice Chairman of the committee, acknowledged the perception problem surrounding the timing of the bombing, but said the attack was justified.

"I mean the context was a bit of a problem because it came right after the president's deposition (on Lewinsky) and the movie 'Wag the Dog' was out, and there was a lot of evaluation of this thing after the fact," he said. The movie involved a plot to distract public attention from a presidential sex scandal by involving the United States in a foreign conflict.

"But the United States of America was attacked," Kerrey said. "We know that Sudan is supporting terrorism, we know that they harbour people that have hostile intent against the United States of America, and we see enough relationships here I think that reach a conclusion this is a reasonable target."

Sen. John Chafee, a Rhode Island Republican, said after the briefing: "I have always felt that bombing was justified.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1999/1058
14 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the continued efforts of the Government of Georgia to prevent arms smuggling and other illegal shipments into Abkhazia, Georgia. Regrettably, there have been numerous incidents involving illegal shipments that have raised concern.

In order to address these issues and to ensure the unimpeded access of humanitarian aid to Abkhazia, Georgia, the President of Georgia passed Special Decree No. 328 on 19 May 1999 bringing into force the Provisional Rules of Navigation to the Seaports of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

Pursuant to the Provisional Rules, owners of vessels or cargoes bound for the ports of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, Georgia, whether they are legal or physical persons, shall notify the competent Georgian authorities of their intention. Such notification should contain the name and type of the ship, a description of the cargo and the expected times of arrival and departure from the port of destination. All vessels heading for Abkhazia are subject to inspection at the Georgian port of Poti in specially designated areas.

The marine border checkpoint at Poti will provide clearance for all the vessels mentioned above to cross the border into Georgia.

The legal regime established by the Decree is consonant with United Nations Security Council resolution 876 (1993) of 19 October 1993 on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, in which the Council calls on all States to prevent the provision from their territories or by persons under their jurisdiction of all assistance, other than humanitarian assistance, to the Abkhaz side and in particular to prevent the supply of any weapons and munitions.

Let me again express the hope that the threat of arms smuggling will come into the focus of the Security Council deliberations on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia.

May I ask your kind assistance in having the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

99-29774 (E) 141099

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/54/463
S/1999/1059
14 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 63
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 13 October 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 October 1999, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-29809 (E) 141099

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Annex

Letter dated 13 October 1999 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letters dated 27 August and 4 October 1999 (A/53/1047-S/1999/932 and A/54/446-S/1999/1034, respectively) addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations, which contain allegations regarding "violations of the airspace of the Republic".

It will be recalled that similar unfounded charges of so-called "airspace violations" were rejected in toto in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 11 August 1999 (A/53/1037-S/1999/879, annex). I would like to emphasize, once again, that flights within the sovereign airspace and flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State over which the Greek Cypriot administration in the South has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever.

While directing such unfounded accusations against the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriot side is blatantly continuing with its massive armament campaign in South Cyprus.

Between 2 and 7 October 1999, the Greek Cypriot administration, together with Greece held joint military manoeuvres, code-named Nikiforos, in South Cyprus. Fighter aircraft and transport planes as well as ships and submarines belonging to the Greek Navy and Air Force participated in these exercises, based on the scenario of a full-scale attack against Northern Cyprus "for the recovery of lost territory". Greek fighter planes bombed mock targets in South Cyprus using live ammunition. Greek and Greek Cypriot political and military leaders present on this occasion made statements to the effect that these exercises were of a higher standard than ever before, and that the so-called "joint military doctrine" between South Cyprus and Greece would be further strengthened by all means.

The Greek Cypriot daily The Cyprus Mail of 8 October 1999 quoted the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Clerides, as saying that Greece has contributed in excess of US$ 1 billion towards the upgrading of the Greek Cypriot National Guard over an unspecified period of time. Mr. Clerides reportedly also told the press that there had been a huge upgrading of armed forces of South Cyprus since last year on all accounts, including the introduction of new weaponry. Russian-made TOR-MI anti-aircraft missiles recently provided by Greece in exchange for the S-300 missiles now deployed in Crete, were put on show along with other heavy weaponry and tanks at a military parade held on 1 October 1999.

The above-mentioned developments prove beyond any doubt that the Turkish Cypriot side is fully justified in its security concerns in the face of the ongoing provocative and hostile activities of the Greek-Greek Cypriot front.

I am enclosing herewith the text of the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in connection with the military preparations of the Greek Cypriot administration, conducted together with Greece, which threaten peace and stability in the island and the region (see appendix).

In this connection, I would like to emphasize that the continuing militarization campaign by the Greek Cypriot side, as well as the restrictive policies directed against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, constitute the underlying causes of tension in Cyprus. My Government expects that the Greek Cypriot side will be strongly urged by the international community to abandon its hostile policies against the Turkish Cypriot people and to stop the armament campaign, which increase tension and hinder progress towards reconciliation between the two States.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its appendix circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ Plümer
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Appendix

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus at Lefkosa, on 8 October 1999

It is observed that the Greek-Greek Cypriot side is currently engaged in military preparations which are at complete variance with the efforts to create a positive atmosphere in Cyprus and the region. In this connection, the celebrations held by the Greek Cypriot administration on 1 October marking the independence day of the so-called Republic of Cyprus, and the parading of heavy weaponry and tanks during these celebrations, as well as the provocative statements made by Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Clerides during the military parade, are grave developments which should be seriously considered.

Mr. Clerides has without any hesitation revealed that the Greek Cypriot side was in possession of a lot more sophisticated weaponry than those newly purchased arms and the Russian made TOR-MI missiles displayed at the parade. Mr. Clerides is on the one hand projecting messages to the world on demilitarization that are devoid of any sincerity, while on the other engaging in a military build-up in cooperation with Greece and spending millions of dollars to purchase new weapons. This clearly demonstrates the enormity of the contradiction that the Greek-Greek Cypriot front is in.

The Nikiforos military manoeuvres held together with Greece in the aftermath of the above-mentioned celebrations are designed to create new tensions on the island and in the region. The manoeuvres which were conducted in accordance with a scenario of a full-scale attack against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as in previous years, and the participation of Greek fighter planes in these manoeuvres using live ammunition, constitutes an outright provocation. The participation of the Greek contingent stationed in South Cyprus in these exercises with tanks and heavy weapons is a further provocation.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot people are carefully following these grievous developments. We express the hope that the international community will also draw the necessary conclusions from these activities of the Greek-Greek Cypriot side, which constitute a threat to stability and security in Cyprus and in the eastern Mediterranean. The joint activities of the Greek-Greek Cypriot side on the island, demonstrate that there is not even a slight change in their objectives. We invite them, once again, to come to their senses.

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/54/465
S/1999/1060
14 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 116 (c)
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 12 October 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw you attention to the statement by the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on the forced removals of civilians in Burundi, issued on 8 October 1999 (see annex).

I should be obliged if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 116 (c), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Marjatta RASI
Permanent Representative of Finland
to the United Nations

99-29815 (E) 151099 151099

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the forced removals of civilians in Burundi issued by the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on 8 October 1999

The European Union strongly deplores the renewed outbreak of violence and internal conflict over the past few weeks in Burundi, mainly in the southern part of the country and around the capital, Bujumbura.

The European Union is disturbed by the renewed rebel attacks, the first victim of which has been the civilian population.

It is also particularly concerned about the recent forced removals by the Burundi army of some 260,000 civilians in the countryside round Bujumbura.

The European Union deplores the violation of human rights, the loss of human life and the destruction of property that have been the hallmark of this operation. It regrets the anguish and suffering to which the civilian population was subjected during their forced transfer to the assembly areas.

The European Union calls upon the Government of Burundi to call a halt to the policy of forced removals and to allow the people to return to their property as quickly as possible. In the meantime, it urges that Government to provide the people with improved sanitary and temporary accommodation conditions.

It notes that the Government of Burundi has assured United Nations representatives and international non-governmental organizations free access to all of the camps concerned to enable them to provide humanitarian assistance. It asks the Burundi authorities to continue to afford the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi and its observers the same access.

The European Union hopes that all Burundi rebel movements will join the Arusha peace process and that all the parties to the Burundi conflict will choose the path of negotiation rather than that of violence and conflict.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus and Malta and the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this statement.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1061
15 October 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1229 (1999) of 26 February 1999, and 1237 (1999) of 7 May 1999,

Recalling the statements of its President of 21 January 1999 (S/PRST/1999/3) and 24 August 1999 (S/PRST/1999/26),

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola,

Reiterating that the primary cause of the present situation in Angola is the failure of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) under the leadership of Mr. Jonas Savimbi to comply with its obligations under the "Acordos de Paz" (S/22609, annex), the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Reiterating also that lasting peace and national reconciliation can only be achieved through peaceful means, and in this regard reaffirming the importance of the "Acordos de Paz", the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Expressing its concern at the humanitarian effects of the present situation on the civilian population in Angola,

Welcoming the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 11 August 1999 (S/1999/871), and the letters referred to therein from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Angola to the Secretary-General of 26 July 1999 (S/1999/871, annex I) and from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Angola of 2 August (S/1999/871, annex II),

Reaffirming its view that a continued presence of the United Nations in Angola can contribute greatly to the promotion of peace, national reconciliation, human rights and regional security,

1. Authorizes the establishment, for an initial period of six months until 15 April 2000, of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) staffed with the personnel necessary to liaise with the political, military, police and other civilian authorities, with a view to exploring effective measures for restoring peace, assisting the Angolan people in the area of capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights, and coordinating other activities;

2. Decides that, pending further consultations between the United Nations and the Government of Angola, UNOA will consist of up to 30 substantive professional staff, as well as the necessary administrative and other support personnel;

3. Stresses that the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) will continue to operate and to be funded in its present configuration;

4. Calls upon all parties concerned and in particular UNITA to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of the United Nations and associated personnel and to respect fully their status;

5. Calls upon the Government of Angola and the Secretary-General to conclude as soon as possible a Status of Mission Agreement;

6. Expresses its readiness to review the configuration and mandate of the United Nations presence in Angola upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government of Angola;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide every three months a report on developments in Angola including his recommendations about additional measures the Council might consider to promote the peace process in Angola;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1062
15 October 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, I have the honour to convey the attached report on the international security presence in Kosovo covering the period from 30 August to 27 September 1999.

I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-30006 (E) 151099

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Annex

Monthly report to the United Nations on KFOR operations

1. Over the reporting period (30 August-27 September), KFOR troops continued their deployment into the theatre. As of 27 September, there were 49,412 troops in place. Sixteen member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have now completed their deployments.

2. Austria, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine all completed their deployments over the reporting period. Russian deployment into the town of Orahovac continues to be hampered by ongoing demonstrations and roadblocks set up around the town by various groups of ethnic Albanians. Efforts to resolve the problems are continuing.

Security

3. The reporting period was characterized by a slight decrease in acts of aggression against KFOR personnel, although there was an increase in tension and violence during the last week of September. There are no indications of these incidents being linked to a campaign against KFOR. Ethnic tension persists, and attacks by ethnic Albanians against ethnic minorities continue, especially against Serbs and their property. Developments in the last days of the reporting period indicate that the tension in areas such as Kosovo Polje, Mitrovica and Orahovac could escalate and spread easily. Over the period, there were an estimated 112 civilian casualties in Kosovo. Five people were detained on suspicion of murder. Residual caches of weapons are still being found throughout the area of operations.

4. KFOR continues to work closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and recently launched a mine-awareness training programme in conjunction with the United Nations Mines Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and other demining organizations. Emphasis is currently being placed on eradicating the threat from cluster bomb units (CBUs) and on clearing border-crossing sites. In this context, KFOR Multinational Brigades (MNBs) have reconnoitred all known CBU locations and have marked the bomblets for disposal by explosive ordnance disposal teams. The aim is to mark all areas and clear as many as possible before the onset of the first snow. KFOR continues to work closely with UNMAS to conduct expedient clearance of those areas that impact on immediate operations. KFOR has cleared 547 schools, and expects to complete school clearance activities by mid-October. As at 18 September, 4,462 anti-personnel mines, 2,331 anti-tank mines and 3,800 bomblets had been cleared. Residual caches of weapons are still being found throughout the area of operations.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. Overall, by K+90 (19 September), the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) was assessed as being in compliance with the 21 June Undertaking signed by the UÇK leadership and the Commander of KFOR. During the course of its demilitarization, UÇK handed in approximately 10,000 weapons, mostly old and in

poor condition. UÇK officially ceased to exist on 20 September. At the same time, the Principles for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) were agreed upon. The KPC will be a multi-ethnic civil emergency service agency, with no law enforcement role, under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has appointed Mr. Çeku as its head. The Commander of KFOR will assist in the tasks the KPC must achieve, will provide day-to-day operational direction to the KPC, and, concurrently, will continue to take a robust line in monitoring compliance and, in particular, will ensure no unauthorized access to weapons.

6. While the senior leadership of UÇK appeared content with the agreement and transition to the KPC, it is likely that some UÇK structures persist. There have been incidents of former UÇK personnel not wearing the newly issued KPC uniform, or still wearing UÇK badges. KFOR will focus on monitoring compliance with the Principles and on supervising the provision of assistance to develop the KPC.

7. Over the reporting period, Serb security forces continued to comply with the terms of the Military Technical Agreement and remain cooperative in their dealings with KFOR, despite occasional encounters between KFOR and Serb elements on the boundary between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia. Seasonal military training by the Serb forces continues.

Cooperation with international organizations

8. KFOR continues to provide humanitarian assistance throughout Kosovo on a daily basis and upon request, focusing on transportation, the distribution of food, medical support, the re-establishment of support services and the protection and escorting of refugees and internally displaced persons.

9. With the police force of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) currently numbering only 1,483 policemen, civil administration in the area of public safety remains principally a KFOR responsibility. Responsibility for police functions in Pristina was transferred from KFOR to UNMIK at the end of August, and more than 560 policemen are deployed there. However, KFOR still conducts security patrols in all major urban areas and in the countryside in order to deter crime and instill a sense of personal safety in civilians. Approximately half of KFOR's total available manpower is directly committed to current protection tasks. KFOR provides daily support to the Kosovo Police School, which conducted its first class on 7 September.

10. KFOR continues to provide security and protection on the border-crossing points into Kosovo and conducts random searches of vehicles, including to prevent the illegal traffic of weapons and military equipment. KFOR also provides security for the transportation of customs duties collected at those border-crossing points manned by UNMIK border police. Currently, six KFOR battalions are primarily involved in border security operations and this responsibility will remain with KFOR, until UNMIK assumes responsibility for border control.

11. KFOR continues to support UNMIK at all levels of the civil administration in Kosovo, and is represented at the Kosovo Transitional Council, which met three times in September, and the joint civil commissions.

12. With respect to infrastructure, KFOR troops are still involved in such tasks as sanitation, securing water supplies and power plant operations. Rail transportation is operated and maintained by KFOR.

Return of refugees and internally displaced persons

13. More than 85 per cent of some 900,000 refugees in regional and third countries have now returned to Kosovo. This flow decreased appreciably in September, when only approximately 22,500 refugees returned home, the majority of them from third countries. Serbs in Kosovo remain isolated and dependent on the aid provided by KFOR and humanitarian organizations in food delivery and medical care. According to latest estimates from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and KFOR brigades, there are approximately 97,000 Serbs still in Kosovo.

Outlook

14. As noted above, the security situation in Kosovo improved in the early part of the reporting period. However, attacks against ethnic minorities, especially Serbs, and their property, remain a major security concern. There is also the danger that tension could escalate and spread from areas such as Orahovac and Kosovo Polje. KFOR will continue to work in close cooperation with UNMIK to address these and other issues in order to maintain peace and stability in Kosovo.